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Judicial Resources and the Common Law: The Public Trust Doctrine as 
Jurisdictional Hybrid 
Abstract 
UK Supreme Court justice Robert Carnwath has urged the judiciary to develop 
“common laws of the environment,” that can operate within differing legal frameworks 
tailored where necessary towards specific constitutions or statutory codes. 1 One such 
mechanism with potential for repositioning environmental discourse in both common law 
and civil law jurisdictions is the doctrine of public trust. 
Basing their arguments upon a claimed heritage of civil law and common law 
descent, supporters are currently testing the scope of the doctrine in US federal courts in 
ground breaking litigation aimed at forcing the federal government to uphold its duty to 
protect the atmosphere. 2  
This paper now asks whether common law judicial resourcefulness can transform a 
transatlantic hybrid of uncertain parentage into a transformative tool of environmental 
protection. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper is set against two specific contemporary political realities. The 
first is the election of Donald Trump as US President. The second is the decision of 
the British people to leave the European Union. Both have potentially negative 
implications for environmental regulation generally and specifically for an effective 
response to the problem of climate change. In the United States, President Trump 
has already begun to deliver on his election promise to unshackle the fossil fuel 
industry from burdensome regulation. On March 2017 he signed an Executive 
Order designed to begin the process of dismantling a wide array of Obama-era 
policies on global warming — including emissions rules for power plants, limits on 
methane leaks, a moratorium on federal coal leasing, and the use of the social cost 
                                                          
1 Robert Carnwath, ‘Judges and the Common Laws of the Environment – At Home and Abroad’ J. 
Envtl. L. 1(2014). 
2 Juliana v. United States, 6:15-cv-1517-TC.  
of carbon to guide government actions.3 In the United Kingdom, withdrawal from a 
European Union regulatory regime of strict standards and long-term targets raises 
the prospect of a loosening of “environmental fetters” and the loss of an important 
mechanism for calling Government to account on environmental commitments; 
these mechanisms, writes one observer, citing to the recent litigation about air 
quality in London4 “may be far from perfect, but the EU does enable action to be 
taken to ensure that governments do meet their obligations, even when that is 
difficult or expensive or just not viewed as a top priority.” 
The question this paper explores is this: if in the US there is at best a 
political failure and at worst a political animus in respect of environmental 
regulation, while in the UK, political will or no, the existing mechanisms of 
environmental regulation face dismantling or undermining, can the common law 
step up to the breach? Can our judges on both sides of the Atlantic, find within our 
shared legal heritage and tradition doctrinal resources that can fill the gap? 
In the United States, the existence of a regulatory regime has so far proved a 
significant barrier to federal common law actions in respect of global warming. In 
American Electric Power v Connecticut,5 the US Supreme Court ruled that corporations 
cannot be sued for greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) under federal common law, 
primarily because the Clean Air Act delegates the management of carbon dioxide and 
other GHG emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In Kivalina Village 
                                                          
3Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, March 28 2017 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential-executive-order-
promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1 last visited 20 August 2017. 
4 See Colin Reid, ‘Environmental Law Outside the EU: An Attempt to Set out the Continuing Ground 
Rules and the New Influences Under Which Environmental Law Will Operate When the UK Leaves the 
EU’ Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (18 July 2016)  http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/61-
7/1021967.aspx, last visited 19 August 2017.  In April 2015 the UKSC made a declaration that the UK was 
in breach of Article 13 of the EU Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) (requiring production of a plan for 
combating air pollution) (R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
[2015] UKSC 28); In 2016, the UK High Court (Garnham J.) ruled that the 2015 Air Quality Plan 
published by the Secretary of State failed to comply with Article 23(1) of the Air Quality Directive 2008 
and its domestic manifestation, Regulation 26(2) of the Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010 
(ClientEarth v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 2740 (Admin)); 
in  April 2017, the U.K. High Court (Garnham J), declined the Secretary of State’s request to extend the 
deadline for producing a plan to after the election (R.(ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, Case No: CO/1508/2016 (transcript available at  
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/the-queen-on-the-application-of-clientearth-v-secretary-of-state-
for-the-environment-food-and-rural-affairs/  last visited 4 May 2017).  
5 564 US 410, 424 (2011) (holding that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power 
plants). For commentary see Haydn Davies, ‘From Equal Protection to Private Law: What Future for 
Environmental Justice in US Courts?’ (2013) 2 Br J Am Leg Studies 163, 180 and sources cited at 180 fn 
105; For a more general discussion of the failure of ‘first-wave’ climate change suits see R. Henry Weaver 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe’ (2017) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2965084, concluding: “[w]hether through deference, displacement, or 
deliberate sabotage, anxious courts have found ways to ignore the climate change plaintiff.” 
v Exxonmobil,6 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed similar reasoning 
in a claim for common law damages brought against Exxon Mobil by a group of Alaskan 
villagers whose village was inundated due to the effects of climate change. Reversals 
though these cases undoubtedly were, under an Obama administration committed to 
tackling climate change via regulation, common law principles were not the tactic of 
choice for environmentally-motivated court challenges. Under a Trump administration 
and a Congress controlled by Republicans with a very different environmental agenda, 
climate change litigation is once more on the table but this time a different set of common 
law principles is in play.  
On November 10, 2016 federal judge Ann Aiken of the US District Court for the 
District of Oregon issued an opinion and order denying the US government and fossil fuel 
industry’s motions to dismiss a ground-breaking climate change lawsuit filed by 21 
youth, age 9 to 20 and from all over the United States. Filed initially against the United 
States, President Barack Obama, and numerous executive agencies, plaintiffs allege that 
despite knowledge “for more than fifty years” that the use of fossil fuels “was 
destabilizing the climate system in a way that would ‘significantly endanger plaintiffs, 
with the damage persisting for millennia’ ... defendants, ‘[b ]y their exercise of sovereign 
authority over our country' s atmosphere and fossil fuel resources, ... permitted, 
encouraged, and otherwise enabled continued exploitation, production, and combustion of 
fossil fuels, ... deliberately allow[ing] atmospheric C02 concentrations to escalate to 
levels unprecedented in human history[.]’”7 Plaintiffs argue defendants' actions violate 
their substantive due process rights to life, liberty, and property. They also argue that 
defendants have violated their obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for the 
people and for future generations.8  
Both arguments seek to break new ground; the first is constitutional and derives 
from the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. The second is an 
assertion of a federal obligation of public trust and derives from common law principles. 
Both will be heavily contested - the Trump administration in conjunction with fossil fuel 
companies is currently seeking an appeal of Judge Aiken’s order.  
 Backing the litigation is Our Children’s Trust, an environmental nonprofit with a 
mission “to protect earth’s atmosphere and natural systems for present and future 
generations.”9 Its founder is Julia Olsen, now Executive Director and Chief Legal 
Counsel, who represents the Trust in the Juliana litigation and leads a team of lawyers 
committed to advocate on behalf of youth and future generations and for legally-binding, 
science-based climate recovery policies. Influencing their strategy and arguments is the 
work of University of Oregon law professor Mary Wood, and specifically her conception 
of what she terms atmospheric trust litigation. Atmospheric trust litigation finds its roots 
in the public trust doctrine, which Wood calls “the oldest doctrine of environmental 
                                                          
6 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir 2012). 
7 Juliana v United States, No 6:15-cv-01517-TC (Dist OR 10 Nov 2016). 
8 ibid. 
9 See https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/mission-statement/, accessed 20 April 2017. 
law” — the idea that governments must hold certain things in trust for public use, such as 
rivers, seas, and the seashore. It’s a concept, she claims, “as old as the Romans, but in the 
United States, it was used to first great effect by the Supreme Court in 1892 to declare 
that navigable waters and submerged lands constituted part of the public trust — the 
government, in other words, had to preserve them for its citizens.”10 For Wood and the 
scholar advocates of Our Children’s Trust the doctrine has a much broader application 
with transformative potential for fighting climate change. “What [the Oregon] litigation 
does is it fast forwards that ... principle to the modern urgency of climate crisis, ... It’s a 
very simple extension of logic. If navigable waters were crucial to the public back then, 
certainly the air, atmosphere, and climate systems warrant protection as public trust 
systems as well.”11 
 Joseph Sax and the Reinvention of the Public Trust  
 The story of the doctrine of public trust in its modern form in the United States is 
closely associated with Professor Joseph Sax whose exhumation, reinvention, 
reformulation, call it what you will, of the doctrine has been well rehearsed. Heavily 
cited; his 1970 seminal article features in the Shapiro list of 100 most cited law review 
articles of all time, 12 but as his critics point out, the doctrine is amorphous, its 
jurisprudential basis unclear and its democratic claims questionable.13 
 In effect, Sax’s article was a call to arms with an avowed purpose: to promote a 
then little known doctrine, as a powerful tool for “effective judicial intervention” on 
behalf of environmental protection and natural resource conservation,14 “[T]he idea of a 
public trusteeship” he wrote: 
 
rests upon three related principles. First, that certain interests--like the air 
and the sea--have such importance to the citizenry as a whole that it would 
be unwise to make them the subject of private ownership. Second, that 
they partake so much of the bounty of nature, rather than of individual 
enterprise, that they should be made freely available to the entire citizenry 
without regard to economic status. And, finally, that it is a principal 
                                                          
10  https://thinkprogress.org/can-this-group-of-kids-force-the-government-to-act-on-climate-change-
349abc0809ab.  (The case she is referring to is Illinois Central Railroad Co v. Illinois, 146 US 387(1892)).  
11 ibid. For a full account of the Juliana litigation and a discussion of the ‘pathbreaking’ nature of the case 
see Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood ‘ “No Ordinary Law Suit”: Climate Change, Due Process 
and the Public Trust Doctrine ’ (2017) 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1. See more generally Mary Christina Wood, 
‘Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age’ (CUP 2013); Mary Christina Wood & 
Michael C. Blumm, ‘The Public Trust in Environmental and Natural Resources Law’ (2d ed. CAP 2015). 
12 See Fred R. Shapiro and Michelle Pearse, ‘The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time’ (2012) 
110 Mich L Rev 1483 (listing Joseph Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention’ (1970) 68 Mich L Rev 471 at joint 46th in their list of the most-cited law review 
articles.). A Westlaw search conducted on 9 May 2017 revealed 3174 articles in   which the term “public 
trust doctrine appears.” 
13 See James L. Huffman, ‘Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public’ (2015) 45 Envtl 
L 337, 346, 348-49. 
14 Joseph L. Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’ 
(1970) 68 Mich L Rev 471, 473  
purpose of government to promote the interests of the general public rather 
than to redistribute public goods from broad public uses to restricted 
private benefit . . . .15 
 
As Carol Rose’s retrospective appraisal explains, his ideas drew on his own 
intellectual hinterground of water law, and reflected a politically contemporary 
frustration with the ability of vested interests to manipulate or even subvert the 
mechanisms of agency regulation. From this point of view they were as much about 
empowering a democratic citizenry as environmental protection.16 As extrapolated from 
generalized principles and nineteenth century precedent17 recognizing and protecting 
public rights of access, navigation and fishing, the ‘public trust’ conception became for 
Sax “a vehicle for insisting that public bodies pay attention to--and adequately vindicate-
-the changing public interest in diffuse resources.”18   
 
 However, as Rose argues, while his public trust began as “a common-law version 
of the then-novel “hard look” doctrine for environmental impacts,” in effect a rule 
requiring close attention to the procedural aspects of environmental decision-making,19 as 
his ideas developed, he began to argue for a broader application with a normative 
emphasis that would “liberate” the doctrine from the “historical shackles”20 that tied the 
doctrine to its roots in water law in favour of its “core” idea of justice expressed in terms 
of trust and trusteeship. Thus ten years after the publication of his seminal article he was 
writing: 
 
The public trust doctrine is not just a set of rules about tidelands, a restraint 
on alienation by the government or an historical inquiry into the 
circumstances of long-forgotten grants. ... The essence of property law is 
respect for reasonable expectations. The idea of justice at the root of private 
property protection calls for identification of those expectations which the 
                                                          
15 Joseph L. Sax, ‘Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action’ (1971) 47 Ind L Rev 165. 
16 Sax (n 12) 473-74; 484(stating that “certain rights are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their 
free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than serfs.”). 
17 See James L. Huffman, ‘Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine is Bad for the Public’ (2015) 45 Envtl 
L 337, 346, 348-349 (discussing Arnold v Mundy, 6 NJL 1 (1821) Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. 367 (1842); 
Illinois Central Railroad Co v Illinois, 146 US 387 (1892). 
 
18 Carol M. Rose, ‘Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust’ (1998) 25 Ecology LQ 351  
19 Such a rule would assume a legislative intent to maintain a broad public use, and [bring] with it 
requirements of attention to matters such as “the collection of adequate information, public participation in 
decisions, informed and accountable choices, and close scrutiny of private giveaways of environmental 
resources,” Rose, (n18) 355 (quoting Sax, (n 14) 557-65). See Sax, (n 14) 491-95 (citing Gould v Greylock 
Reservation Commission, 215 NE2d 114, 117-19 (Mass 1966) holding that lease of 4.000 acres of 
reservation land and management agreement exceeded the statutory grant of authority); ibid 509-10 (citing 
Priewe v Wisconsin State Land and Improvement Co, 67 NW 918 (Wis 1896)); ibid 528-30 (discussing 
development of tidelands protections in California). 
20 Joseph L. Sax, ‘Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles’ (1980) 14 UC Davis L 
Rev 185. 
legal system ought to recognize.21 
 
 As it became then, the task should be “to identify the trustee's obligation with an 
eye toward insulating those expectations that support social, economic and ecological 
systems from avoidable destabilization and disruption.”22 In the hands of its current 
proponents, the doctrine is recast in the form of an inherent limitation on sovereign 
power that applies to both states and federal government alike and a judicial mechanism 
for calling governments to account for failing to effectively tackle air pollution and 
climate change. 23 
 
 At federal level, the United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit has given 
this argument short shrift, citing to the US Supreme Court decision in PPL Montana, 
LLC v Montana to the effect that “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law” 
and that “the contours of that public trust do not depend upon the Constitution.” 24 In Alec 
L ex rel Loorz v McCarthy, the DC Circuit dismissed the argument that Montana applied 
“only to the state public trust doctrine and thus casts no doubt on the potential existence 
of any federal public trust doctrine.”25 The Juliana case currently now set down for trial 
in Oregon will pick up this argument which will in the end be for the US Supreme Court 
to resolve if the case gets that far.26 At state level however, as Professor Robin Kundis 
Craig’s work demonstrates, the doctrine is alive and well and in some states has 
developed well beyond its origins in water rights law to the point where, she argues, it is 
not unreasonable to conclude there is not one but 50 public trust doctrines.27  
 
In its classic form, as recognised by the US Supreme Court in the nineteenth 
                                                          
21 ibid at 185-186. 
22 ibid at 193. 
23 See Brief of Law Professors in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari as Amicus Curiae for Petitioners at 
1, Alec L ex rel Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. Appx 7 (DC Cir 2014) (No. 14-405) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae 
Brief], 2014 WL 5841697 arguing that the doctrine is an “inherent limit on sovereignty which antedates the 
US Constitution and was preserved by the Framers as a reserved power restriction on both the federal and 
state governments.” 
For Professor Richard J Lazarus’ critique of the value of “atmospheric trust advocacy” and a response from  
Michael C. Blumm, see Richard J Lazarus, ‘Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public 
Trust Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?’ (2015) 45 Envtl L 1139 (reviewing his earlier article: 
‘Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust 
Doctrine’, (1986) 71 Iowa L Rev 631(arguing that the public trust doctrine was outdated and should make 
way for federal and state statutory regulation). For Michael C, Blumm’s response see ‘Two Wrongs? 
Correcting Professor Lazarus’s Misunderstanding of the Public Trust Doctrine’ (2015) 46 Envtl L 481, 
489: “Properly understood, the PTD’s sovereign ownership is not only a defense for government 
regulators, but an antidote to government inaction, preventing privatization and calling for protection of 
select resources to preserve them for the beneficiaries: the public, including future generations.”  
  
24 Alec L ex rel Loorz v McCarthy, 561 F. Appx 7 (DC Cir 2014) (citing to PPL Montana LLC v Montana, 
_U.S. _, 132 S Ct. 1215, 1235, 182 L Ed.2d 77 (2012)). 
25 ibid. 
26 Juliana v United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC (Dist OR 10 Nov 2016). 
27.Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Climate Change, State Public Trust Doctrines and PPL Montana,’ (January 17 
2014) The Water Report, February 2014; University of Utah College of Law Research Paper No 57 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2380754 last visited 19 August 2017.. 
century case of Illinois Central,28 the American public trust doctrine replicated the 
English common law of public rights in respect of navigable waters, including rights of 
commercial navigation and fishing and rights of access to submerged lands for the 
purpose of exercising those rights. The only significant change from the English law was 
to extend the definition of navigable waters to include waters that were navigable-in-fact 
as well as waters that were tidal.29 In Illinois Central itself, the doctrine also operated to 
restrain alienation by the state on the basis that ownership of submerged lands was an 
attribute of sovereignty that could not be divested. As Professor Huffman has argued, the 
decision was an extreme case and “most courts understood that the public rights 
functioned in the nature of an easement or servitude without regard to ownership of the 
submerged lands.”30 
 
While this may have remained the case in most states “through the first many 
decades of the twentieth century,”31 recent research undertaken by Professor Kundis 
Craig reveals the flexibility and adaptability of twenty-first century public trust state 
doctrines that, she asserts in the hands of a willing state judiciary, have the capacity to 
provide an effective judicial response to the environmental challenges of climate change. 
As of 2010, she reports, at least sixteen states 
 
have at least nascent ecological public trust doctrines, representing an 
evolution of the American public trust doctrine far beyond its classic 
protection of public rights to navigate, fish in, and engage in commerce on 
navigable waters. In addition, since 1971, courts in at least six states have 
consciously characterized their states' public trust doctrines as adaptive and 
evolutionary, and four of these states have used those evolutionary 
doctrines to rebalance private rights and public values in public trust 
waters.32 
 
                                                          
28 Illinois Central Railroad Co v Illinois, 146 US 387 (1892). 
29 This paralleled  the definition in federal law for the purposes of commerce clause regulation and 
reflected a geographical imperative, namely that many of the big American inland water systems e.g. the 
Mississippi and the Missouri, while essential for the purposes of trade and commerce, were not tidal. 
30 Huffman, (n 15) 358-49. 
31 ibid. 
32 See Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law 
Public Trust Doctrines’ (2010) 34 Vt L Rev 781, 850; Robin Kundis Craig, ‘A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust’, (2010) 37 Ecology L.Q. 53; Robin Kundis Craig, ‘A Comparative Guide to the 
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries’ (2007) 16 
Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 1. See also Michael C. Blumm, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine: A Twenty-First 
Century Concept’ (2010) 16 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 105 (discussing the evolution of the 
public trust doctrine); Michael C. Blumm, 'Public Property & the Democratization of Western Water Law’ 
(1989) 45 Envtl L. 573 (predicting that state courts will continue to expand the public trust, relying 
especially on constitutional provisions declaring water to be publicly owned.) 
 This is not the place to rehearse the range and detail of these responses. For this 
the interested reader should consult Professor Craig’s research, subject to one 
observation which I pick up on later, namely that some states have amended their 
constitutions to mandate environmental protection,33 thereby, as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court observed, “installing the common law public trust doctrine as a 
constitutional right to environmental protection, subject to enforcement by an action in 
equity.”34   
 
 The Public Trust and a Narrative of Origin 
 Across the pond, in 2015, these US state cases attracted the attention of UK 
Supreme Court Justice Lord Carnwath in a case concerning public rights of access and 
recreational use over coastal beaches. 35 At issue was the decision of a County Council to 
register an area of beach as a village green pursuant to the provisions of the Commons 
Act 2006. This required establishing that public rights of access and recreation had been 
enjoyed ‘as of right’ (ie without right) as opposed to ‘by right’(ie in the exercise for 
example of rights conferred by common law). 
 The only reported case directly on point was the 1821 decision of Blundell v 
Catterall.36 In that case, the defendant had used the beach “between the high-water mark 
and the low-water mark of the River Mersey” at Great Crosby in Lancashire for the 
purpose of providing bathing facilities, including bathing machines and carriages for 
members of the public who wished to swim in the sea. The Supreme Court endorsed the 
Blundell majority ruling that, absent a right established by usage and custom, there was 
no “common-law right for all the King’s subjects to bathe in the sea and to pass over the 
seashore for that purpose”37 but paid some attention to a strong dissent from Best J. Lord 
Neuberger summarized his views thus. The judge, he said: 
 
“in effect followed the view expressed in Bracton’s De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae, where it is written “Naturali vero iure communia 
                                                          
33 eg Rhode Island; Louisiana; Vermont; Pennsylvania; Illinois., Alaska, Florida, Hawaii. According to 
Mary Turnipseed et al. at least 42 states now either expressly mention public trust principles or contain 
some mention of environmental protection or natural resources. See Mary Turnipseed et al, ‘The Silver 
Anniversary of  the United States' Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, 
and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine’ (2009) 36 Ecology LQ 1, 70 (citing generally to 
Alexandra B. Klass, ‘Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards’ 
(2006) 82 Notre Dame L Rev 699, 714 (“While some state constitutional provisions do no more than 
authorize the legislature to enact environmental laws (which it already has authority to do under its inherent 
police power), others codify the common law public trust doctrine or set out a constitutional policy to 
protect the environment. Yet others grant rights to all citizens for a ‘clean and healthful environment’ or 
place mandatory duties on the state to protect the environment.”) (footnote omitted); Matthew Thor Kirsch, 
‘Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions’ (1997) 46 Duke LJ 1169. 
34  Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc. 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa. 1973) (Jones CJ 
dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
35 R (on the application of Newhaven Port and Properties Limited) v East Sussex County Council [2015] 
UKSC 7. 
36 106 ER 1190 (1821).  
37 [2015] UKSC 7 ¶33 (quoting Holroyd J, Blundell v Catterell, 106 E.R. 1190, 1197 (1821). 
sunt omnium haec: aqua profluens, aer et mare et litora mare, quasi mari 
accessoria. Nemo igitur ad litus maris accedere prohibetur” (By natural law 
these are common to all: running water, air, the sea, and the shores of the sea, 
as though accessories of the sea. No one therefore is forbidden access to the 
seashore).”38  
 
Lord Neuberger took the view that for the Blundell majority, led by Holroyd J, Best 
J was stating the civil law rather than the common law position39 but with respect, this is 
oversimplification. Best J’s decision is not a model of clarity but at its conclusion comes 
this passage:  
 
My opinion is founded on these grounds. The shore of the sea is admitted to 
have been at one time the property of the King. From the general nature of 
this property, it could never be used for exclusive occupation. It was holden 
by the King, like the sea and the highways, for all his subjects. The soil could 
only be transferred, subject to this public trust; and general usage shews that 
the public right has been excepted out of the grant of the soil.40  
 
 It was this passage that led Lord Carnwath, who agreed with the overall decision 
but wrote separately in search of a comparative dimension, to the US state court decisions 
concerning the existence and contours of a doctrine of public trust. These US state court 
cases he suggested, offered an “illustration of how the law in this country might have 
developed (and might yet develop) if the view of Best J had prevailed over that of the 
majority.”41  
 Having mooted the possibility, Lord Carnwath ultimately did not pursue the 
capacity of the doctrine of public trust to resolve English common law disputes 
concerning public rights of access to the foreshore for recreational use. English law as it 
currently stands does not recognize a doctrine of public trust either in terms of rights of 
common ownership or of restrictions upon alienation and certainly not -as yet – in terms 
of a public obligation of environmental protection. Nevertheless – and this is the irony 
that prompted this paper, - on the other side of the Atlantic, commentators and indeed 
courts at both state and federal level continue to rehearse in mantra-like fashion a 
narrative that ties the doctrine to asserted roots in English common law. As recounted by 
Professor Huffman, the “generally accepted storyline” goes something like this:  
 
Roman law, as communicated to us across the centuries by Justinian, 
recognized and protected public rights in especially important natural 
resources. These public rights constituted the jus publicum. ... Justinian 
recorded - to paraphrase - that air, flowing water, the sea and the shores of the 
                                                          
38 ibid at ¶ 34. 
39 ibid. 
40 Blundell v Catterall, 106 E.R. 1190 (Best J dissenting) (emphasis added). 
41 [2015] UKSC 7 ¶ (Lord Carnwath JSC). 
sea are by natural law common to all.42  
... 
 Commentators and the occasional judge pick up the story about seven 
centuries later with the English judge Henry of Bracton who reported in his 
De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae that the jus publicum of Roman law 
was also the law of England. Sometimes Magna Carta is part of the story ...  
 
“British settlers brought the concept of the public trust to America when they 
claimed ownership by the right of discovery.” ... Lord Chief Justice Matthew 
Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem is most often cited as the 
authority relied upon by American courts .... The New Jersey Supreme Court 
decision in Arnold v. Mundy is generally cited as the first case to apply the 
doctrine on American soil. But it is always best to have a United States 
Supreme Court opinion to rely upon, even when we are talking about state law, 
so the story of the history of the public trust doctrine concludes with Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v Illinois.43 
 
 The problem, claims Professor Huffman is that much of the story is either 
distortion or wrong. Relying on extensive but largely overlooked research, he concludes 
that Arnold v Mundy “announced an American law of title to submerged lands that 
reflected neither the law nor the fact of English practice,” an error that Illinois Central 
Railroad then compounded.44 Nevertheless, the fact that this is a narrative that is largely 
fictitious and its claims to historical accuracy have been comprehensively debunked45 
does not appear to have diminished its force or prevented its repetition, not just by 
Professor Sax, forty years ago, and now by contemporary advocates of his “expansive 
public trust doctrine” but also in more recent statements of the judiciary and at the 
highest level. Thus in Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho (1997),46 we find the US 
Supreme Court affirming that the principle, (of public trust) arose from “ancient 
doctrines” – the Court cited to the Institutes of Justinian47 and came into English law via 
Bracton, Magna Carta and Lord Hale,48 while as recently as 2012, in PPL Montana LLC 
v Montana the Court asserted: “The public trust doctrine is of ancient origin. Its roots 
                                                          
42 Huffman, (n17) 9-10. 
43 ibid 9-11 (internal citations omitted). 
44 See Huffman, (n 17) 30 and generally 29-93. 
45 See ibid 12 (n.32) 13, (explaining that he has relied heavily on the historical research and analyses of 
Patrick Deveney and Glenn MacGrady whose work he claims has been generally ignored. “Before them, 
Stuart Moore’s comprehensive treatise was similarly ignored.” See Patrick Deveney, ‘Title, Jus Publicum, 
and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis’ (1976)1 Sea Grant L J 13; Glenn J MacGrady, ‘The 
Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Developments, Current Importance, and 
Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water’ 3 Fla St U L Rev 511 (1975); Stuart A Moore, ‘A History of the 
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trace to Roman civil law and its principles can be found in the English common law on 
public navigation and fishing rights over tidal lands and in the state laws of this 
country.”49  
 
 Given the meticulous research of his sources and the compelling nature of his 
analysis it is difficult to refute Professor Huffman’s conclusion: an initial 
misunderstanding of English law has given rise to a myth of common law origin that is 
now firmly established at both state and federal level and has received the imprimatur of 
the US Supreme Court. His admonition - “[t]hey (the judiciary) are making it up as they 
go” – is similarly difficult to resist but note his rider; they may indeed be making it up as 
they go, but in so doing, he adds, they are acting “in the tradition of some of the common 
law’s greatest lawyers.” 50 
 
 The last part of his article and the thrust of a more recent (2015) article then 
focuses on the requirement of common law precedential reasoning and its potential for 
non-democratic lawmaking.51 These arguments are often rehearsed, are well-known and 
no less significant for that. In the words of Indiana Supreme Court Justice Donald Hunter 
“[t]he strength and genius of the common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing 
needs of the society it governs.”52 In the words of Professor Huffman, “American courts 
function within a constitutional separation of powers that assigns the lawmaking function 
to the legislative branch of government.”53 Judicial recognition of an expanded public 
trust doctrine will, he claims, constitute not only a usurpation of the legislative function; 
it will also require the courts to declare new public rights at the expense of existing 
private rights in “double violation of the principle of the rule of law.” 54 Given the 
opportunity, the US Supreme Court may or may not rule on this issue;55 the question I 
now want to pick up concerns the potential of a public trust doctrine, in “traditional” or 
“expanded” form in its alleged alma mater jurisdiction, the common law of England. 
 
 “Internationalizing” the Public Trust 
 
 As the United Kingdom prepares to leave the European Union and with it the 
supervisory and compliance mechanisms of the Commission and the CJEU, it faces a 
potential weakening of the regulatory frameworks of environmental law.56 In this context, 
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56 For a discussion of “[t]he long reach of EU governance mechanisms” in environmental law, with specific 
reference to the post-Brexit vulnerability of the EU Habitats Directive, see Maria Lee, ‘Brexit: 
Environmental Accountability and EU Governance’ (OUPblog Oct. 17th 2016), 
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Lord Carnwath is not alone in recognizing the attractions of a doctrine of public trust. 
Marc Willers QC of the English Bar and Emily Shirley, UK representative of Our 
Children’s Trust have recently advocated the ‘resurrection’ of the English public trust. 57 
“Now is the time” they argue, “for lawyers and judges to revitalize the PTD so that there 
is proper oversight and supervision of decisions taken by the UK Government which 
affect the environment as well as its environmental policy and legislation.”58 In similar 
vein, Bradley Freeman and Emily Shirley have argued that the public trust doctrine offers 
a mechanism for climate change litigation going forward.59 Both pieces repeat the same 
narrative myth; the doctrine is an “ancient common law principle;”60  
 
 [t]he history of the [public trust doctrine] shows that it is universal. 
Indeed, its roots lie in a melding of civil law and common law. The 
concept of res communes ... originated in Roman Law and was 
transported to English common law when English jurists read and applied 
Justinian’s Institutes ... In the 13th century, Lord Bracton incorporated 
parts of Justinian’s Institutes into his own treatise ... Lord Chief Justice 
Matthew Hale’s 1667 treatise Concerning the Law of the Sea and its 
Arms had a huge influence on English law ... The PTD also finds its roots 
in Magna Carta .... As seen above, both Justinian and Magna Carta 
influenced the common law doctrine of Public Trust during this period in 
time.61 
 
 As discussed previously, the narrative of descent from English common law 
origins is largely myth and there is no doctrine of ‘public trust’ currently recognized in 
English law that can subject government to a fiduciary duty of environmental protection. 
Indeed Tito v Waddell (No 2),62 invoked in aid by Freeman and Shirley, in many ways 
does the reverse. Governmental obligations, such as those owed by the British 
Government to Ocean Islanders in respect of royalties due under mining agreements, 
while they may give rise to what might be termed ‘trusts in a higher sense,’ do not, in 
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general, give rise to fiduciary obligations enforceable in a court of law.63 As Justice Finn 
explains, in English law and also his own jurisdiction, Australia, the language of trust, 
when used in respect of government and agency responsibilities, operates by way of 
political metaphor only and imposes no legally binding obligation.64 Even in its 
traditional form, as Charles Sampford insightfully argues, the classic trust or trust in the 
lower sense still reflects an eighteenth century Chancery model of specific property held 
by nominated trustees upon trust for the benefit of ascertainable beneficiaries, a model 
that is not well suited to the task that public trust proponents urge for it.65 I return to this 
point presently. 
 
 Justice Finn, albeit more optimistic than his compatriot concerning the “allure” of 
public trust, nevertheless concedes that the doctrine “has had almost no discernible 
impact in Australian law.”66 This allure has not gone unnoticed in Canada, another 
common law jurisdiction. In 2004 the Canadian Supreme Court “flirted” briefly with the 
doctrine when considering a compensation claim in respect of environmental damage to 
public lands brought by the Crown against the company largely responsible for the loss.67 
Rejecting the claim for environmental loss for lack of supporting evidence, the Canadian 
court noted that the doctrine of public trust had led in the United States to successful 
claims for monetary compensation. Citing specifically to New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection v Jersey Central Power and Light Co.,68, in which the State of 
New Jersey successfully sought compensatory damages from a power plant operator for 
environmental harm for which the operator was responsible, 69 Binnie J. noted the 
development potential of the common law as a tool of environmental protection but 
cautioned that absent a statutory regime to address environmental loss, the Court must 
proceed in a “principled and incremental way” which was not possible in that case.70 
 
 Other jurisdictions have been less cautious. US public trust advocate Michael 
Blumm and his co-researcher Rachael Guthrie have recently claimed that the public trust 
has become “internationalised”71 and leads “a vibrant and significant life abroad.” 72 
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They identify “ten diverse countries on four continents: India, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada” in which in their 
view “the doctrine has become equated with environmental protection.” 73 As previously 
noted, the doctrine in Canada is embryonic and in the other countries, as Blumm and 
Guthrie acknowledge, the doctrine is at least supported by and in many cases explicitly 
derives from constitutional or statutory provisions or both and this is true also of India 
and the Philippines, the two countries they identify with the most substantial public trust 
doctrine jurisprudence. The Indian doctrine is the most extensive and draws explicitly on 
the shared English common law heritage. In the seminal case M.C. Mehta v Kamal Nath 
(1997), the Indian Supreme Court said: 
 
Our legal system--based on English common law--includes the public trust 
doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural 
resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at 
large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and 
ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to 
protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be 
converted into private ownership.74 
 
However this paragraph comes at the conclusion of a long recitation of the American 
case law entrenched narrative of doctrinal descent and Professor Sax’s article and 
subsequent cases have expressly linked the doctrine to constitutional requirements 
including specifically the right to life.75  
 
 UK Supreme Court Justice, Lord Carnwath, who has himself “flirted” briefly with 
the doctrine of public trust76 has spoken positively of the important role that judges can 
play in the development and enforcement of environmental law at both national and 
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international levels. 77 Writing for the Guardian in 2012 in the immediate aftermath of the 
Rio Earth Summit, he commended the “decade of progress” that followed the 
“unequivocal” recognition of this crucial developmental role by the UNEP sponsored 
global judges’ symposium that took place in Johannesburg in 2002.  The “widespread 
acknowledgment of an international ‘common law’ of the environment based on 
principles such as sustainability, and inter-generational equity”78 represented a major 
achievement. Ten years later, the presence in Rio of “more than 150 judges, prosecutors, 
public auditors and enforcement agencies from some 60 countries” was testament to the 
efforts of “judges in courts and tribunals across the world .... to give practical effect to 
laws for the protection of the environment.”79 However, what is now required is a system 
of “common laws of the environment,” i.e. doctrinal mechanisms that can operate within 
differing legal frameworks albeit tailored where necessary towards specific constitutions 
or statutory codes. 80 
 
 Jurisdictional Hybrids, Common Law Fictions and Constitutional Nomos 
 
This paper began as a search for a doctrine of public trust as just such a 
mechanism, a jurisdictional hybrid, with roots in both civil and common law and the 
potential to provide a conceptual framework for considerations of intergenerational 
equity and fiduciary obligation to have a role in matters of environmental justice. It 
uncovered an example of what the doctrine’s first promoter termed “judicial 
cleverness”81 with a largely fictitious foundational narrative that the US Supreme Court 
has recognized, that some jurisdictions now accept, but others and notably the UK 
Supreme Court, so far cannot. The question then becomes less about doctrinal origins, 
roots or ancestry and more about the interaction between common law development and 
the doctrinal narratives within which it must operate.  
In one of the most cited observations in legal literature82 Robert Cover 
memorably remarked:  
 “We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe. We constantly create and 
maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and 
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void. […] No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning.”83  
Professor Cover’s account of “jurisgenesis” or the creation of legal 
meaning84 is particularly appropriate to common law jurisdictions where judges 
draw on historical narratives to ground assertions of principle and deploy fictions 
rooted in ancient forms and precedents as legitimising tools of legal development. I 
referred earlier to the words of Indiana Supreme Court Justice Donald Hunter 
concerning the adaptability of the common law as jurisprudential strength. 85 The 
United States and the United Kingdom are common law countries with a normative 
universe that draws on a common legal ancestry and narrative sources but the 
doctrine of public trust flourishes in the one but not in the other. Public trust law, 
wrote Joseph Sax, “is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with 
the public domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived 
imperfections in the legislative and administrative process.”86 Judges in a common 
law system are no strangers to the task of mending perceived legal imperfections 
but the doctrine of judicial precedent that they work with is a normative dynamic of 
both strength and limitation. Doctrinal continuity ensures legitimacy but requires a 
narrative of origins and uninterrupted genealogical descent; change or adaptation 
disrupt the narrative and threaten law’s normative claims. When common law 
judges attempt to work the dynamic they must first recast the foundational 
narrative. The historical narrative that supports the doctrine of public trust in the 
United States has largely been debunked; I suggest that the fact that it continues to 
be repeated, in many ways no longer matters because it has been supplemented by 
and reframed within another narrative, that of state sovereignty that is, in its own 
way, also fictitious but which has significance in US constitutional arrangements 
that does not apply in the same way in the so-called alma mater – the UK.  
Federalism US style, as currently envisaged, requires a constitutional 
narrative of state power which casts the fifty several states as sovereigns within 
their own borders and seized of a state police power that does not depend upon the 
federal constitution but is assertable” if not “interposable” 87 against encroachments 
by the federal government. This conceptualization of state power depends in its 
turn upon a narrative of transmission from the English king in consequence of the 
Treaty of Paris 1783 which acknowledged the sovereignty of the thirteen named 
colonies and ceded to them all claims to their government, propriety and territorial 
rights.88 The narrative is fictionalized in relation to the 37 states that came into the 
union at a later date by means of the so-called Equal Footing doctrine which 
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governs the terms of their admittance and endows them with all the attributes of 
sovereignty enjoyed by the original thirteen.89  
In relation to the doctrine of public trust, the twin narratives of common law 
“ancient descent” and transmission of sovereign power came together in mutual support 
in the nineteenth century “foundational cases.”  Thus in Arnold v Mundy (1821), from 
New Jersey, Kirkpatrick CJ said: 
[U]pon the Revolution, all those royal rights vested in the people of New 
Jersey, as the sovereign of the country, ... are now in their hands; and ... they, 
having themselves both the legal estate and the usufruct, may make such 
disposition of them, and such regulation concerning them as they may think fit; 
... this power of disposition and regulation can be exercised only by the 
legislative body, who are the representatives of the people for this purpose; but 
...  they cannot make a direct and absolute grant, divesting all the citizens of 
their common right; such a grant, or a law authorizing such a grant, would be 
contrary to the great principles of our constitution, and never could be borne by 
a free people.90 
A year later in Illinois Central, Professor Sax’s “lodestar” case the Supreme Court 
quoted with approval: 
prior to the Revolution the shore and lands under water of the navigable 
streams and waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the king of Great 
Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved to the state by 
right of conquest. ...  [A]fter the conquest the said lands were held by the state, 
as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, 
and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and other 
facilities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were 
publici juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large.91 
More recently, in Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,92 the US Supreme Court 
has affirmed that public trust principles derive from state ownership of the beds and 
banks of navigable waters; that this ownership is an attribute of state sovereignty; that 
this sovereign title was recognized by English common law principles prevailing within 
the former thirteen colonies before the Revolutionary War and is now attributable to all 
states by virtue of the Equal Footing doctrine, the constitutional basis on which all states 
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were subsequently admitted to the Union. As the court explained, “[t]he principle which 
underlies the equal footing doctrine and the strong presumption of state ownership is that 
navigable waters uniquely implicate sovereign interests.”93  
However, because sovereignty in US constitutional arrangements is dual and the fifty 
states share their sovereignty with the people via their directly elected representatives, 
they are not the only repositories of sovereign attributes and obligations. As the Supreme 
Court explained in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v Thornton “the Congress of the United States 
is not a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by 
appointed delegates but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people.” 94   
In Alec L v McCarthy (2014), a group of respected constitutional scholars and advocates 
trialled the claim currently being pursued by the Juliana claimants, that the federal 
government was subject to a public trust duty to protect the atmosphere. The DC Circuit 
dismissed for lack of standing and the claim that the doctrine is an “inherent limit on 
sovereignty which antedates the US Constitution and was preserved by the Framers as a 
reserved power restriction on both the federal and state governments” 95 has yet to be 
heard by a higher court. At federal level, however, the twin narratives of descent and 
inherited sovereign power and obligation do not work quite so well; the federal 
government is entirely the creature of the federal constitution. If the doctrine is to 
succeed it must be cast in broader terms. 
 
  In 1980, Professor Charles Wilkinson, writing for the same symposium at which 
Professor Sax called for the “liberation” of the public trust, attempted to locate an 
underlying basis for the doctrine in a model of popular sovereignty whereby the federal 
government acts as trustee on behalf of the general population.  Arguing from cases 
relating to the nature of federal ownership of public lands he claimed to detect a 
nineteenth century jurisprudential shift away from the idea that the United States held 
newly acquired lands only temporarily and upon trust to transfer them to future states, in 
favour of the idea of permanent holding and management upon trust for the benefit of the 
population as a whole. 96 By about 1970, he claimed, the idea of public trust in relation to 
federal lands was sufficiently established to function not just as a source but more 
significantly as a limit on federal power.97 
 
  As Professor Huffman has pointed out the fallacy in this argument lies in 
confusing the classic model of the proprietary trust with the legitimate confidence of the 
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nation’s people that their elected representatives will act in the public interest.98The 
classic proprietary trust cannot work, he explains, where the alleged trustee is at the same 
time beneficiary and ultimate creator of the obligation. 99 It is for this reason, he argues, 
that current advocates seek to frame their claims of “inherent limits of sovereignty” by 
reference to a higher imperative of “nature’s law,” or, in the words of Mary Wood, an 
approach that “defines government's duty in natural resources management as obligatory 
and organic to governmental power [and suggests] a trust limitation as an attribute of 
government itself.” 100  
 
  As Huffman points out, appeals to natural law, which this must be, are by no 
means unknown in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence but carry with them a history that 
has not always been positive and remains controversial.101 Should a higher U.S. court 
rule favourably on these grounds, the case will indeed be “the case of the century.”  The 
question for this paper however is whether similar arguments can be satisfactorily 
deployed in the UK alma mater and if not, why not.  
 
Wood has argued that “properly cast as intrinsic to government, and reaching back to 
fundamental understandings that are part of sovereign duty” the Nature's Trust 
framework offers lawyers and judges from all jurisdictions including those outside the 
common law world the tools “to unearth the public trust doctrine from their own 
jurisprudential history and mould it to their modern legal architecture. 102”The task, she 
says, is urgent: 
 
Broadening the jurisdictional reach of the doctrine is essential to arrest the 
hemorrhage of nature's destruction currently taking place through the 
instrument of environmental law at all levels of government.103 
I have argued that the doctrine of public trust has worked in the United States 
because it taps into and is engrafted upon a constitutional dynamic whereby the States 
and the federal government define themselves and the extent of their powers largely in 
opposition to each other. The States possess the inherited police power, and retain 
sovereignty over their affairs subject to the limits of the Constitution; the federal 
government represents the people but is endowed with enumerated powers only, the very 
existence of which can represent the boundaries of state power. The Tenth Amendment is 
preservative of state sovereign powers to the extent that they have not been taken away 
by the Constitution thereby ensuring that state sovereignty remains an important driver of 
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contemporary federalism but also and incidentally, the constitutional battleground upon 
which those parameters are tested.104 
In UK constitutional arrangements however, where sovereignty is unitary and 
located within a parliamentary system, this internal power sharing dynamic does not arise 
and this is so, devolution notwithstanding. Devolution, U.K. style is not federalism and 
does not as yet encroach significantly, if at all, on the constitutional supremacy of the 
sovereign parliament. 105 In this very different context, debates about inherited attributes 
of kingship become conceptualized in terms of the survival and remaining extent of 
prerogative power but this is of course exercisable by government ministers on behalf of 
the Crown. To the extent that the power does not depend upon a grant of Parliamentary 
authority and its exercise is subject to only to limited judicial review, a discourse that 
invokes the prerogative will necessarily be seen as anti-democratic.  
As currently deployed and as the Brexit experience points up, sovereignty rhetoric 
in the United Kingdom is directed externally and, as we see presently directed towards 
the EU, is formulated largely in terms of control of borders and national autonomy. This 
means that a discourse of fiduciary obligations as counterpart of inherited regal power 
that underpins the doctrine of public trust in the United States has not only failed to 
develop in the United Kingdom but is unlikely to do so absent an alternative narrative. 
 It is true, as mentioned earlier, that Professor Justice Paul Finn of the federal court 
of Australia has toyed briefly with the parallels between governmental obligations and 
the fiduciary nature of trusteeship.106 His context was a concern with setting standards of 
behaviour and establishing a culture of accountability in public office and although his 
work attracted considerable interest at the time, in his later work, he has rowed back from 
the comparison.107 “In the age of statutes and of government under statutes” he suggests, 
the task of “channelling and controlling the exercise of public power” requires a focus 
upon statutory interpretation and judicial review for which abstract principles drawn from 
the law of trust are not suited. Thus, contrary to his earlier views, he now considers it 
unlikely  
 
that the characterisation of the State as a trustee of its powers of government 
for the people - a trust founded upon the proposition that “the powers of 
government belong to, and are derived from ... the people” - will provide 
workable criteria upon which to found judicial review of official decision 
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making, save perhaps in bleak, almost unthinkable circumstances. It is too 
abstract for everyday use. 108 
 
This is not however, to downplay the role of the trust metaphor as a criterion of 
legitimacy and as such, arguably, or possibly, a fundamental principle of the common 
law. Whether, in the UK, a trust metaphor as a mechanism of environmental protection 
can be deployed by common law judges as a tool of statutory interpretation or judicial 
review, remains yet to be seen. Recent experiments with referendums in the UK have 
tempted some commentators to suggest a new constitutional dynamic in which popular 
sovereignty now trumps that of the sovereign parliament.109 In R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union110 the suggestion was roundly refuted by the U.K. 
Supreme Court, but as the Daily Mail intuits and Professor Green explains, when formal 
constitutionalism threatens to turn them into “enemies of the people,” they should 
remind themselves that “Parliamentary sovereignty is an institutional device, helpful 
where it secures important values, but a hindrance when it does not.”111 Whatever the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations, the UK will, at least for the time being, remain a 
member of the Council of Europe and a signatory to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. While it is true that neither the Convention nor the Additional Protocols 
cover any environmental rights or any interest in the preservation of the environment, 
there are some indications of a developing right to life jurisprudence that can 
encompass, at least a duty to protect life against environmental disaster.112 Whether our 
judges can as Justice Finn suggests “breathe further life into [these] principles by 
acknowledging that there are emerging public interests and values which warrant 
protection from legislative or executive encroachment and which should be protected in 
the same way that we now protect fundamental rights and interests”113 remains to be 
seen. There is no doubt of the importance. As Mary Wood herself might say - there is 
the Earth to play for. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108 ibid at 336. 
109 See Les Green, ‘Should Parliamentary Sovereignty Trump Popular Sovereignty’, Semper Viridis (2016-
11-03), https://ljmgreen.com/2016/11/03/should-parliamentary-sovereignty-trump-popular-sovereignty/ 
110 [2017] UKSC 5. 
111 Green, (n 109). 
112 See Öneryıldız v Turkey , 30 Nov. 2004 (Grand Chamber); Budayeva and Others v Russia  
20 March 2008. 
113 Finn, (n 64) 39. It has been suggested, for example, that failure to meet carbon reduction budgets under 
the UK Climate Change Act 2008 would be non-justiciable, which does than potentially open space for 
public trust litigation. See Colin Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of “Outcome Duties” in the 
Climate Change and Child Poverty Acts’ (2012) 4 Public Law 749-767. I am indebted to an anonymous 
reviewer of this article for the observation that ‘there is no reason in principle why EU ambient air quality 
objectives addressed to the government would be justiciable (Client Earth litigation) while broadly similar 
objectives in respect of CO2 etc would not.  
